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CIVIL ACTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY:




The term "anomalous" jurisdiction' evokes amorphous notions
which even the well-schooled legal mind would not easily grasp. Yet the
term has been applied to incidents in which federal courts, without stat-
utory authority, have provided a forum to entertain independent actions
for the return of property wrongfully held by federal officers. Normally,
a Motion for the Return of Property is made pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(e).2 When federal officers or
agencies hold property, and no indictment or information has been
filed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply. 3 The ag-
grieved individual is left without statutory recourse, compelling the cre-
ation of a judicially-devised jurisdiction, coined "anomalous"
jurisdiction to entertain such independent actions for the return of
property.4 The anomalous character of such suits is evinced by their
characterization as a hybrid civil-criminal procedural vehicle.5 Despite
its exercise by the federal courts, the difficulty in pinning down the con-
cept to a particular jurisdictional premise could lead skeptical commen-
* Professor of Law, Western State University (San Diego Campus). B.A. University
of Pittsburgh, 1967; J.D. California Western, 1974; LL.M. Columbia University, 1975.
1. Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688-89 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965). The Lord opinion coined the term "anomalous" for seeking return of property
illegally held by the I.R.S. in the absence of any criminal proceedings which would have
triggered the Rule 41 (e) Motion for Return of Property. Lord appeared to limit this relief
to situations involving threatened criminal prosecutions rather than to civil or administra-
tive actions. Id. at 689.
2. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides:
Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was
seized for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful
possession of the property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the mo-
tion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in
evidence at any hearing or trial. If a motion for return of property is made or
comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is
filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
3. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern criminal proceedings. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 1 (scope of rules) & 2 (purpose of rules). Prior to the filing of an indictment or
information, there are no proceedings. Contra Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoo-
ver, 327 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
4. Independent actions of this sort are noted in 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 762 n.42 (2d ed. 1982).
5. FED. R. CraM. P. 41 (e) is inapplicable absent indictment, and the exercise of civil
jurisdiction typically precludes further criminal proceedings.
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tators to question its very existence. It is obvious that anomalous
jurisdiction exists merely by virtue of its repeated exercise.
Property can come into the government's hands many ways, but
generally possession results from voluntary or involuntary disclosure.
6
When the government holds property for an extremely long period of
time,7 there is a potential conflict with the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable seizures. 8 Parties have thus attempted to invoke
the anomalous jurisdiction of the court by alleging violations of the
first, 9 fourth,' 0 fifth,"' and sixth 12 amendments of the United States
Constitution.
This article will analyze the jurisdictional and practical problems
which result from the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction. It is main-
tained that the recent elimination of the amount-in-controversy require-
ment in cases involving federal questions' 3 does away with the
procedural potholes associated with its exercise. Furthermore, it is
urged that Congress enunciate a statutory basis for return of property
which is held unreasonably in situations where no indictment has been
issued. Such legislation would eliminate the drain upon judicial re-
sources caused by repeated attempts to ascertain the source and nature
of anomalous jurisdiction. '
4
6. Voluntary disclosure results from consent. See, e.g., Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d
426, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1977) (action for return of records and accounts voluntarily loaned
to I.R.S. agent, successful on ground of subsequently withdrawn consent); Richey v.
Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir. 1975) ("anomalous" jurisdiction exists to hear and
determine allegations of invalid consent for permission given to I.R.S. agent to take busi-
ness records).
Involuntary disclosure results from searches. See, e.g., the search and seizure provi-
sions of FED. R. CaIM. P. 41.
7. See, e.g., Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th
Cir. 1978) (hearing required, not on legality of search, but constitutionality of holding
property for 17 months without charging plaintiff with criminal offense).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
9. See Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(first and fourth amendment claims arising from F.B.I. surveillance activities).
10. See Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1977) (anomalous jurisdic-
tion found in action for return of materials voluntarily loaned by taxpayer to I.R.S., analyz-
ing consent cases in fourth amendment context).
11. See Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1983) (fourth and fifth
amendment claims of plaintiff are justiciable under section 1331, the general federal ques-
tion statute); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir. 1975) (anomalous jurisdiction
existed in case alleging violation of Miranda rights).
12. See Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (alleged violations of
fifth and sixth amendments, but complaint dismissed due to a lack of equity jurisdiction).
13. In 1976, Congress deleted the $10,000.00 minimum-amount-in-controvery re-
quirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for subsequent actions "brought against the United States,
any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." Act of Oct.
21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
In 1980, Congress deleted the minimum amount in controversy for subsequent
§ 1331 federal question suits. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369
(1980).
14. The problem of anomalous jurisdiction warrants more commentary than it has
received. "Anomalous" jurisdiction is addressed in 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 762 n.42 (2d ed. 1982). The Motion for Return of Property is also addressed
in 8BJ. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 41.06[5] (2d ed. 1983). Other commentary
now relevant to injunctive relief against federal officers includes Comment, The Supervisory
ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION
I. SOURCE OF ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION
A. The Development of Anomalous Jurisdiction
If it can be said that a legal concept can have an ancestor, then one
might trace the roots of anomalous jurisdiction to attempts by the
Supreme Court to extend protection to federal litigants under the
Court's "supervisory power." This power was first applied to ensure the
proper administration of criminal trials in federal courts, 15 and was sub-
sequently extended to govern non-judicial acts of officials in other
branches of government. 16 Consequently, when in a pre-indictment
context, a party was not "aggrieved" within the meaning of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41 (e), 17 the lack of existing criminal proceedings
technically foreclosed the possibility of a remedy. Because judicial relief
is said to have developed as a means for protecting citizens from
procrastinating officers, anomalous jurisdiction could owe its develop-
ment to the nonstatutory supervisory power to control officers of the
court.
Still, the theoretical basis of a pre-indictment jurisdiction to return
illegally held property is difficult to ascertain and, therefore, in need of
clarification. 18 One major area of confusion is whether to apply the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.1 9 Some opinions have boldly suggested that the criminal rule
allowing a Motion for the Return of Property may be read broadly to
encompass pre-indictment relief,20 but the question remains open.
Power of Federal Courts, 76 HpAsv. L. REV. 1656, 1660-64 (1963) (Supervision Over Execu-
tive) and the law review articles cited in C. WIGrr, LAw oF FEDERAL COURTS 180 n.25 (4th
ed. 1983) (questioning former jurisdictional amount in controversy for injunctive suits
against federal officers).
15. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (supervisory power extends to
proper administration of criminal justice in federal courts).
16. See Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 1050,
1062 (1965) (Supervision Affecting Out of Court Behavior of Nonjudicial Officers); Com-
ment, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 -ARv. L. REV. 1656, 1660-64 (1963)
(Supervision Over Executive).
17. See supra note 2.
18. In the recent case addressing confusion in the case law, the ChiefJudge's concur-
ring opinion referred to anomalous jurisdiction as "a confused body of caselaw in need of
clarification." Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1285 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark, CJ., concur-
ring). The majority responded that the cases cited in the ChiefJudge's opinion were con-
sistent with its disposition of the case, noting that he had not shown why the doctrine is
confusing. Id. at 1282 n.4. Cases in other districts, which analyze the confusion regarding
the propriety of such a motion, include In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453,458 (2d Cir.) (addressing
property rights in context of pre-indictment return motion), cert. dismissed, 332 U.S. 807
(1947); Donlon v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 979, 980 n.5 (D. Del. 1971) (cases not uni-
form); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963) (tracing theoretical difficulties
with anomalous jurisdiction), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
19. See In re J.W. Schonfeld, Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D. Va. 1978) (Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are fully applicable); Silbert v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 765,
768 (D. Md. 1967) (field of pre-indictment motions should be reviewed and clarified);
Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Mass. 1963) (action not in all aspects subject to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); United States v. Bell,
120 F. Supp. 670, 672 (D.D.C. 1954) (motion incidental or ancillary to pending criminal
action, and so closely associated with criminal proceeding, it should be deemed part of it).
20. In re Worksite Inspection of Quality Prod. Inc., 592 F.2d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1979)
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One practical aspect of this area of the law is nevertheless clear:
when property is held by federal officers, aggrieved individuals must
seek its return in a federal court. Although the Supreme Court has not
decided whether state courts can enjoin federal officers, it denied certio-
rari to a Third Circuit case so holding.
2 1
Initially, the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction in civil federal ques-
tion cases presented two problems, yet only one remains. The first
problem, now non-existent, was that plaintiffs faced the procedural hur-
dle of meeting the 10,000 dollar requirement for federal question
cases. 2 2 The problem was exacerbated when a failure to allege federal
question jurisdiction transformed the action into a controversy concern-
ing federal taxes, 23 in which case the return of property violated the
Anti-Injunction Act. 24 Nevertheless, these problems were remedied by
elimination of the 10,000 dollar requirement in federal question cases.
The remaining problem is ascertaining an acceptable basis for the
exercise of this judicial power,2 5 because the federal question statute
does not independently confer subject matter jurisdiction, nor does it
provide any insight concerning how the aggrieved individual should
proceed. Plaintiffs are, therefore, filing independent actions by way of
petition, motion, or complaint. 2 6 The following section will address the
various jurisdictional premises for the exercise of anomalous
jurisdiction.
(Rule 41 (e) allows for pre-indictment motion for return of property); Smith v. Katzenbach,
351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc) (equitable result can be reached by broad
reading of Rule 41(e)); Klitzman v. Krut, 591 F. Supp. 258, 266 (D.N.J. 1984) (Rule 41(e)
contemplates pre-indictment relief); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F.
Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Rule 41(e) can be basis for jurisdiction to hear motion for
pre-indictment relief from an unconstitutional search and seizure); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F.
Supp. 684, 687 (D. Mass. 1963) (supposition that Rule 41 (e) applies only after indictment
is incorrect), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
21. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v. McGinnes, 278 F.2d 330, 331 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960).
22. See supra note 13 regarding amendments to the federal question requirement.
23. See, e.g., Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 36 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff did not
contend that § 1331 federal question jurisdiction is applicable, thus avoiding characteriza-
tion of controversy as one concerning federal taxes rather than case involving solely search
and seizure), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). Further, a tax audit is not preliminary to or
in connection with a judicial proceeding. United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 479-80
(1983).
The Anti-Injunction Act is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). This Act is analyzed
infra text accompanying notes 125-32.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
25. As stated by ChiefJudge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he exercise ofjurisdiction
was 'anomalous' because the federal courts had created their own jurisdiction without any
constitutional or statutory basis in the face of inconsistent, if not antithetical, Congres-
sional expression." Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1285 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring).
26. Jurisdiction was granted, even in early pre-indictment suppression cases initiated
by motion, petition, or a bill in equity. Goodman v. Lane, 48 F.2d 32, 35 (8th Cir. 1931)
(citing authorities). Jurisdiction in modern return of property cases is similarly noted
whether initiated by petition, motion, or complaint.
ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION
B. Jurisdictional Premises for Anomalous Jurisdiction
As stated, there is no statutory or constitutional authority for the
exercise of anomalous jurisdiction. The cases expressly 27 or impliedly
exercising it have found or suggested that its doctrinal existence is
rooted in one of five (arguably six) supporting theories: (1) the inherent
power of supervision (within which the sixth category, "reaching for-
ward," arguably exists); (2) a general equity jurisdiction; (3) vitiated
consent; (4) constitutional tort; and (5) general federal question
jurisdiction.
1. Inherent Power of Supervision
The Supreme Court has not authoritatively defined the constitu-
tional source of its supervisory power over the judicial branch of govern-
ment.2 8  The scope of such a power over executive officers is
questionable. Therefore, the inquiry is: how far can this power be
stretched? The most sweeping pronouncement came in 1963, in the
case of Lord v. Kelley:
[I]t seems to this Court that the Supreme Court has extended
or will extend the anomalous jurisdiction as to reach unlawful
searches and seizures by a federal agent connected with the en-
forcement of law ....
To this Court, the indications are that the Supreme Court
intends that where a federal criminal prosecution is probable, a
federal trial court shall have non-statutory jurisdiction to enjoin
federal enforcement officers from holding or using property
they unlawfully seized.
2 9
The message of this oft-cited case has been applied to agents of the
I.R.S., 30 O.S.H.A., 3 1 Customs Service, 3 2 E.P.A.,33 F.B.I., 34 Bureau of
Narcotics, 35 a private attorney,
36 the Postal Service, 37 and the D.E.A.
38
27. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 724 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1984); Linn v.
Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983); Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir.
1979); Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1975); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1975); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497
F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Campola, 543 F. Supp. 115, 116 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Resmondo
v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 19, 20 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In reJ. W. Schonfeld, Ltd., 460 F.
Supp. 332 (E.D. Va. 1978); Dolan v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 979 (D. Del. 1971); Lord
v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
28. See generally United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (motion
successful in context of threatened civil enforcement proceeding); Hill, The Bill of Rights
and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 193-213 (1969) (Supreme Court has actu-
ally avoided consideration of the constitutional basis for the judicial supervisory power).
29. Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688-89 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965) (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. See, e.g., Marshall v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 608 F.2d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1979).
32. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979).
33. See Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979) (reversing trial
court determination that E.P.A. employee not officer of the court).
34. See Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
35. See Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (citing Rea v. United
1985]
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The supervisory power has been applied in a civil context also;39
therefore, this basis for the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction would
seemingly apply whether an action be deemed civil or criminal in nature.
Application of the supervisory power in civil matters, however, may be
stretching the judicial canvas too far beyond Justice Frankfurter's pru-
dential concern in McNabb:
[W]e confine ourselves to our limited function as the court of
ultimate review of the standards formulated and applied by fed-
eral courts in the trial of criminal cases. We are not concerned
with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts them-
selves become instruments of law enforcement.
40
Extending the supervisory power to executive agents, who are not
officers of the court, could conflict with the doctrine of separation of
powers.41 In addition, a civil damage remedy may arise directly under
the fourth amendment;4 2 therefore, injunctive relief protecting the same
constitutional guarantees need not arise under the comparatively amor-
phous supervisory power. Sanctioning a nonstatutory remedy in this
context goes beyond the judicial housekeeping function of the supervi-
sory power. 43 Combined with the proposition that "the effect of the
Fourth Amendment in civil cases is not totally settled,"'44 to enjoin fed-
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (enjoining federal narcotics agent from testifying in state
proceeding)).
36. See Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1975) (attempt to enjoin private
attorney from cooperating with government under anomalous jurisdiction).
37. See Hitzman v. Krut, 591 F. Supp. 258, 266 (D.N.J. 1984).
38. See DeMassia v. Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984).
39. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946). In exercising the super-
visory power, the Supreme Court determined that blanket exclusion of a certain socio-
economic group from jury services tarnishes administration of civil justice in federal
courts. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (private books, invoices, and
papers constitutionally inadmissible in criminal proceedings, also determined inadmissible
in related civil proceedings); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 184 (N.D. Ohio
1966) (court determined illegally seized property not related to the crime must be
returned).
40. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
41. See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 203
(1969); Morris, The End ofan Experiment in Federalism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L.
REv. 407,427 (1961); Comment, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv.
1656, 1661 (1963).
42. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (cognizable money damage claim for violation of fourth amendment arises directly
under the Constitution itself). After Bivens, the Federal Tort Claims Act was amended to
provide statutory relief against the United States for the constitutional torts of its federal
officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). Congress is currently considering limiting the
individual liability of federal officers, who are typically judgment-proof, by amending the
Act to preclude tort claims against them. See Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Tort
Claims At, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 1 (1979).
43. See supra text accompanying note 40. Further, one might infer a Supreme Court
position that the supervisory power of the federal courts does not embrace the ability to
regulate I.R.S. agents. Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 576 (1938).
44. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 403 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The effect, in terms of a damage remedy, became clearer in Bivens, see supra note 42,
while the effect of an injunctive remedy remained hazy. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERA. CouRTs 180 n.25 (4th ed. 1983) (collected law review articles discussing this issue).
In searches conducted by administrative agencies the supervisory power of the courts
ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION
eral officers from retaining illegally held property is better rooted in
some ground other than the inherent power of supervision.
45
It might be contended that the doctrine of reaching forward4 6 is an
independent ground for the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction, yet it is
unlikely such a contention would succeed in light of the doctrine's char-
acterization as an exercise of a court's equitable powers, 47 and as an
exercise of the supervisory powers.48 The cases discussing this theory4 9
have accordingly failed to link it to any single jurisdictional basis. One
thing does, however, remain clear: the reaching forward concept is not
a distinct basis for the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction. Rather, it is
better recognized as a means of portraying the factual circumstance trig-
gering the exercise.
2. General Equity Jurisdiction
As early as Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court alluded to the
right of an injured party to claim protection of the laws. 50 Where no
"law" exists, the equity side of modern federal courts5 ' is alert to grant
may be even less effective than in criminal searches. This is because "[p]robable cause in
the criminal law sense is not required." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320
(1978); accord United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (no requirement of probable
cause for search where taxpayer fraud is suspected unless it is shown enforcement of ad-
ministrative order would be an abuse of judicial discretion).
45. See, e.g. Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975). The Hunsucker court exemplifies the uncertainty and split of authority
regarding the supervisory powers of the courts. The court observes that the earlier cases
suggest a court's power is limited solely to officers of the court, but such power does not
extend to non-officers such as I.R.S. agents. The court then states that the more recent
trend suggests a court's powers do extend to non-officers such as I.R.S. agents. The court,
however, says it will pretermit the issue of the court's power and simply "assume" it has
supervisory powers over I.R.S. agents. Contra In re Wilton Assoc., Ltd., 49 F.R.D. 170, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court, after recognizing that one is not "aggrieved" under Rule
41(e) absent indictment, states that "[o]ur jurisdiction, therefore, must rest upon the gen-
eral supervisory power of federal courts over federal law enforcement officials. ... (em-
phasis added).
46. This particular theory was best stated in Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1, 3 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933): "Though no indictment be pending, the court may
reach forward to control the improper preparation of evidence which is to be used in a
case coming before it, and can always by summary procedure restrain oppressive or unlaw-
ful conduct by its officers." Foley was relying on the Supreme Court decision in Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1930) (where complaint for return
of property alleged unconstitutional seizure, U.S. Attorney and prohibition agents subject
to power of the court).
47. See, e.g., Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979).
48. See, e.g., Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
49. See Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rapp, 539 F.2d 1156, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1976); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 32 n.3
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 815-
16 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Foley v. United States, 643 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1933).
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (the "very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
wherever he receives an injury").
51. The merger of law and equity courts was established by the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In other words, there is only one form of action, regardless of whether
relief is at law or in equity.
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relief for federally protected rights.5 2 In that anomalous jurisdiction is
an extension of federal authority to protect individual rights when statu-
tory law is lacking, the doctrine could find a viable theoretical basis in
the general equity jurisdiction of the court.
The Supreme Court has, accordingly, condoned the application of a
federal court's equitable powers to tailor a remedy for the individual
suffering executive abuses involving constitutional questions. 53 Specifi-
cally, the Court has suggested that "[o]nce a constitutional violation is
found, a federal court is required to tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to fit
'the nature and extent of the violation.' "54 This power generates a wide
latitude of discretion, because an equitable remedy is only narrowly re-
viewable under the abuse of discretion standard. 5
5
Federal courts have applied this general equity jurisdiction to in-
junctions concerning the return of property5 6 and, in so doing, have
defined the scope of its application. A court's equitable powers, like all
court powers, should not unduly interfere with the executive function.5 7
The Supreme Court has consequently cautioned against equitable in-
junctions that affect criminal proceedings. Therefore, the propriety of a
motion for the return of property brought as an independent action is
sometimes conditioned on its connection to a pendent criminal proceed-
ing. Thus, "[oinly if the motion is for the return of property and is in no
way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant can the pro-
ceedings be regarded as independent."'5 8 This avoids the problem of an
equitable extension by a court that may interfere with a criminal prose-
52. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (the Supreme Court, in dicta, recognizes
federal courts may issue injunctions to protect constitutional rights).
53. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392, 394 (1971) (violation of the fourth amendment may give rise to money damages).
54. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 744 (1974)).
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973).
56. Pieper v. United. States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979); Mr. Lucky Messen-
ger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 16-17 (7th Cir. 1978); Meier v. Keller, 521
F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Donlon v. United States,
331 F. Supp. 979, 980 (D. Del. 1971); Chakejian v. Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965).
57. Compare the cases collected in the law review articles in note 41 supra.
58. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) (decision on motion for
return of property is independent, and thus final for purposes of appeal, only if not tied to
cniminal prosecution). Further, a mere audit is not considered to be preliminary to, or in
connection with, a judicial proceeding. See aLso United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 479-
80 (1983) (I.R.S. may not obtain grand jury materials to aid in the investigation of civil tax
liability).
A related problem is whether subsequent events should be considered as a means of
determining if there is a prosecution in existence for purposes of appeal. See In re Search
Warrant, 750 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that subsequent events should be
considered, citing authorities from other circuits).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, additionally, has stated: "[sleveral circuits have
given this test a strict reading and have required that any criminal action against the mo-
vant be beyond the investigatory stage and into an accusatory stage by the filing of
charges. Other circuits have been less restrictive and have deemed a criminal action to be
in esse before arrest or indictment." DeMassa v. Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283, 1286.87 (9th Cir.
1984) (citations omitted). See infra note 98 for a discussion of the term "in esse."
ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION
cution. If an indictment does issue, the appropriate remedy for return
of property is the motion provided under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 41(e). Rule 41(e) also functions to codify the exclusionary rule
since inadmissibility is part of the remedy.
59
The caveat of caution and restraint accompanies every potential ex-
ercise of anomalous jurisdiction, regardless of which underlying theory
is applied.60 This caveat is improperly ignored where Rule 41 (e) is read
broadly to apply in the absence of an indictment. The courts have read-
ily expanded Rule 41(e) to support the notion that equity jurisdiction
exists to cover pre-indictment motions not covered by the rule. 6 ' Yet
another concern voiced in the supporting Advisory Committee Note
suggests that a broad reading of Rule 41(e) to incorporate pre-indict-
ment relief is desirable as fostering expediency in criminal proceedings:
the "purpose [of Rule 41 (e)] is to prevent multiplication of proceedings
and to bring the matter before the court in the first instance."'6 2 Fourth
amendment violations are effectively adjudicated on the merits prior to
criminal proceedings when the rule is so interpreted. Nevertheless, ju-
dicial expansion of Rule 41(e)63 evokes the equally valid criticism that
application of the rule to encompass pre-indictment relief amounts to
judicial legislation, since the rule expressly applies to criminal matters.
3. Revoked Consent
Constitutional problems are not always triggered by macabre cir-
cumstances or fatally defective warrants. Occasionally, such problems
arise in the context of conventional I.R.S. investigations when the subse-
quently aggrieved individual initially cooperates with federal officers.
Internal Revenue Service investigations often commence with routine
tax interviews with, or audits of, the taxpayer. Problems may occur
when the taxpayer initially consents to production of documents and
that consent is subsequently revoked by the court or individual because
it was obtained in a coercive manner. Cases involving either voluntary
or coerced consent 6 4 present a scenario distinct from exercises of anom-
59. See supra note 2.
60. See Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1983); Pieper v. United
States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979); Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978); Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1975); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238,
242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
61. Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 983 (1975);
Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Pieper v. United States,
460 F. Supp. 94, 96 n.1 (D. Minn. 1978), affid, 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979).
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) Advisory Committee Note.
63. See Pieper v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 94, 96 n. 1 (D. Minn. 1978), aftd, 604 F.2d
1131 (8th cir. 1979); see also Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1975); Hunsucker
v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Smith v.
Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
64. Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239,
(5th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Chakejian v. Trout,
295 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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alous jurisdiction that are attributed to the court's supervisory power or
general equity jurisdiction. This distinction is supported in part by the
pronouncement that the judicial supervisory power does not extend to
I.R.S. agents.
6 5
Where voluntary consent is the sole justification for government
possession of property, there is no illegal seizure, but the retention may
become illegal if that consent is withdrawn. In this fourth amendment
context, the Supreme Court has promulgated the standard of assent
without coercion, viewed by the totality of the circumstances. 66 A
waiver of fourth amendment rights is not governed by the strict stan-
dards applied to other waivers. 6 7 A less exacting standard for fourth
amendment waivers, however, does not mean that such waivers are un-
qualified. An action seeking return of documents voluntarily loaned to
the I.R.S. is illustrative. In Mason v. Pulliam, the government argued that
initial consent forever waived fourth amendment rights, particularily
since a subsequent demand for the return of property (records and ac-
counts) would frustrate a clearly legitimate investigation without advanc-
ing constitutional concerns. 6 8 The court, in affirming the return order,
noted that federal officers could not go beyond the scope of the consent
originally given. Under this interpretation, revocation of the waiver re-
instated the taxpayer's fourth amendment rights.
69
Pre-indictment return of property actions alleging other constitu-
tional violations have proven more difficult for taxpayer plaintiffs. For
instance, where consent has been attacked on grounds of self-incrimina-
tion,70 the decisions evince a judicial trend against interference with a
criminal prosecution. Some of the rationale applied in the preclusion of
pre-indictment relief in this context include decisions that Miranda warn-
ings7 ' are not necessary in noncustodial I.R.S. investigations, 7 2 and that
adequate civil 73 or criminal7 4 remedies eliminate the need to order re-
turn of property.
65. Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
66. Schneckloth v. Bustemorte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (state must demonstrate
consent was voluntarily given; such a determination is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances).
67. Id.
68. 557 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 428 (citing United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971) (de-
fendant in criminal prosecution, initially consenting to search, called off the search,
thereby limiting scope of consent) and United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (after discovery of damaging evidence, consenting defendant revoked consent,
thereby immediately limiting scope of search)).
70. Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Chakejian v. Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
71. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
72. Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 812-14 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Chakejian v. Trout,
295 F. Supp. 97, 102 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
73. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1982) regarding procedure for judicial review of a
tax summary. This permits civil actions under the I.R.C. without the necessity of resorting
to independent injunctive relief. The adequacy of this remedy at law was upheld in Reis-
man v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) and Justice v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.
Ky. 1967) (per curiam).
74. As discussed throughout the text, the criminal remedy is FED. R. CriM. P. 41(e).
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Allegations of the unconstitutional deprivation of the right to coun-
sel have been equally unsuccessful. These sixth amendment claims have
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel where documents are not pro-
vided prior to grand jury testimony75 or where there is an investigative
interview designed to establish criminal liability.7 6 In every instance,




In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, held that a suit for damages may arise di-
rectly under the Constitution itself.78 This established a non-statutory
remedy against federal officers for violations of the fourth amendment.
Subsequently, the Federal Tort Claims Act (F.T.C.A.) was amended to
codify this remedy for suits against the United States. 79 The fourth
amendment ameliorates jurisdictional problems by extending the non-
statutory supervisory power to federal executive officers. 80 Yet the
F.T.C.A. does not permit injunctive relief,8 1 even though such relief
may present a remedy for constitutionally-barred misconduct by individ-
ual officers.
82
The Bivens basis for anomalous jurisdiction has been suggested, but
remains undecided. 8 3 If Congress does not provide for injunctive relief
in forthcoming amendments to the F.T.C.A., 8 4 and general federal
75. See supra note 72 for sixth amendment cases.
76. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Minn. 1979) (witness may
have attorney present outside room where grand jury investigation is being conducted); In
re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (no constitutional right to be assisted by counsel in
giving testimony at an investigatory proceeding). FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) is also applicable.
It provides that only a government attorney, not a defendant's attorney is allowed in a
grand jury room during an investigation.
77. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.Minn. 1979); Chakejian v.
Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97, 99 (E.D.Pa. 1969). See also Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 813
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
78. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (claim arises directly under fourth amendment). The subse-
quent cases establishing a similar tort remedy are Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
(claim arising directly under fifth amendment) and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
(claim arising directly under the eighth amendment).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982) (includes 1974 amendment withdrawing sovereign im-
munity of government when torts are committed within scope of employment).
80. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
81. See Moon v. Takiasaki, 501 F.2d 389, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But seeJaffee v. United
States, 592 F.2d 712, 718-19 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelley v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356, 362
(E.D.Pa. 1981). Both Kelley andJaffee limit injunctive relief permitted under F.T.C.A. for
constitutional violations.
82. See Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Torts Claims Act, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1-
17 (1979) (amendments would remove individual liability of federal officers and federal
employees) [hereinafter "Proposed Amendments"].
83. Bivens, in conjunction with the federal question jurisdiction of § 1331, was argued
with a multitude of theories in Pieper v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 94, 96 (D.Minn. 1978),
afid on other grounds, 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979). Bivens jurisdiction was also suggested,
but deemed inapposite, in Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1286 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark,
CJ., concurring).
84. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 82; see also infra text accompanying notes
152-55 regarding expansion of proposals to include injunctive relief.
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question jurisdiction does not independently support anomalous juris-
diction,8 5 the need for its exercise will remain intact. The propriety of
an extension of Bivens, from an implied damage remedy8 6 to an implied
injunctive remedy, is hampered by the observation that the connection
between the two remedies is too tenuous to invoke its application. In
addition, using the fourth amendment to justify a court's injunctive pow-
ers involving executive agencies might conflict with the separation of
powers doctrine.
Because a suit for the return of property is in reality a suit against
the United States,8 7 additional problems arise. The United States can-
not be sued without its consent,8 8 and congressional consent to such
suits should be narrowly construed,8 9 although the Supreme Court has
denied sovereign immunity to government agents who act in an uncon-
stitutional manner. 90 In recognition of the absence of any statute con-
ferring general jurisdiction over federal officers and agencies, 91 the
apparent lack of a provision for injunctive relief under the F.T.C.A.,
9 2
and the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
pre-indictment injunctive relief,93 the judiciary should resort to a less
hostile basis for its exercise of anomalous jurisdiction.
5. General Federal Question Jurisdiction
Section 1331 of the Judicial Code for federal courts provides that
the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions aris-
ing under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'9 4 Fed-
eral judicial decisions create the federal common law in contrast to the
statutory law enacted by Congress. For purposes of section 1331, fed-
eral common law is arguably included among the laws of the United
85. See infra section I(B)(5).
86. Bivens' codification, by 1974 amendments to the F.T.C.A., essentially provides a
damage remedy implied from violations of the fourth amendment. Its purpose is still via-
ble for other constitutional torts. The subsequent utilization of the Bivens implied damage
remedy rationale in the cases is cited in note 78 supra.
87. When a federal officer exceeds powers granted by the sovereign, actions beyond
those limitations are individual rather than sovereign. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949). There is, however, qualified immunity for "good faith"
violations, which might preclude monetary relief. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Since federal officers are generally judgment proof or unable to act without authority, the
real target is or ought to be the government. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 82 at
7-10. See generally Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 435 (1962).
88. Supreme Court case authority for this consent requirement ranges from 1834 to
the present. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (dicta); United
States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834) (dicta).
89. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1940) (dicta); Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894).
90. Cf. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-23 (1963) (dicta) (suit brought to enjoin
United States officials dismissed for want of jurisdiction, because suit was in reality one
against the United States, and the United States' consent was lacking).
91. 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MxLLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3655, at 172 (1976) (citing McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971)).
92. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (emphasis added).
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States. The Supreme Court failed to resolve this contention in 1959
when presented with the opportunity to incorporate federal common
law into the word "laws." '95 However, in 1972, the Court held that sec-
tion 1331 jurisdiction existed over claims involving the federal common
law of interstate pollution.96 To date, this opinion stands alone as the
only case to suggest such a broad reading of the word "laws," and its
effect was subsequently nullified by Congress.9 7 Therefore, if anoma-
lous jurisdiction is a part of the federal common law, its exercise cannot
be regarded as attributable to the general federal question statute, sec-
tion 1331.
The federal courts have nevertheless announced a federal common
law to provide for the return of property when there are no criminal
proceedings pending.98 These courts have drawn upon Supreme Court
directives to fashion relief when federal rights are involved. 9 9 Yet the
very existence of anomalous jurisdiction has been questioned by these
courts,1 00 thereby suggesting that its exercise presents a federal ques-
tion cognizable under section 1331. This possibility, however, conflicts
with judicial constructs resolving doubts against the existence of juris-
diction, 10 1 or the concern that the application of federal common law is
confined to only a few circumstances.
1 0 2
Another related approach to finding a niche for anomalous jurisdic-
tion within the general federal question statute was facilitated by elimi-
nation of the amount in controversy requirement. This approach
requires an interpretation of section 1331 as incorporating the federal
common law, a proposition of questionable validity. 10 3 Some have sug-
gested that the elimination of the amount in controversy requirement
has entirely eradicated the need for independent recognition of anoma-
95. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959).
96. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972).
97. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (subsequent
stage of 1972 Illinois v. Milwaukee interstate pollution case, wherein the Court held its
earlier common law remedy was pre-empted by 1972 federal pollution legislation).
98. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text. Also note the distinction between
when a criminal proceeding is pending and when it is "in esse" for the purpose of a motion
or complaint for the return of property. The term "in esse" was used in the aforemen-
tioned context in DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) and applies in
situations in which there is an outstanding complaint, a release following arrest or arraign-
ment, information, or indictment. Some courts require that for a criminal proceeding to
be in esse, the proceedings must have gone beyond the investigatory stage and be in the
accusatory stage which is signified by the filing of charges. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
716 F.2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1983); Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 571
(6th Cir. 1982); Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir.
1978). This jurisdictional split regarding the term "in esse" is described in DeMassa v.
Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights
are concerned." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
100. See, e.g., Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983). In his concurrence,
ChiefJudge Clark stated that "anomalous" jurisdiction-once a necessary evil-has become
a superfluous anachronism . . . a dead letter." Id. at 1285.
101. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
102. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
103. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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lous jurisdiction. 10 4 No matter what it is labeled, as long as property
continues to be wrongfully held by federal officers in the absence of an
indictment, the judiciary will find a remedy, the semantics of which will
remain the domain of the commentators.
II. A PROPOSED TEST TO DETERMINE WHEN THE EXERCISE OF
ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION IS APPROPRIATE
Whether anomalous jurisdiction has an identifiable source or basis
in the law of federal jurisdiction is a question obviously susceptible to
much debate and confusion, to which the preceding portions of this arti-
cle attest. That question is then left to the authors of judicial opinions.
What remains to be determined is: What are the appropriate circum-
stances for its exercise? A number of concerns have surfaced.' 0 5 The
following proposition assumes that because of its anomalous nature,
anomalous jurisdiction is best characterized as an exercise of the equita-
ble powers of a court. A three-tiered test comprising primarily equitable
criteria is therefore offered because it incorporates the apparent con-
cerns of courts which have engaged in the exercise of anomalous juris-
diction. The test requires (1) disregard of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights, (2) irreparable injury, and (3) unavailability of alternative
remedies.
A. Disregard of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights
Reliance upon any particular constitutional provision has not been
critical. 10 6 Violations of the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments
have been alleged in anomalous jurisdiction cases seeking the return of
property illegally held by federal officers. 10 7 The unreasonable search
and seizure provision of the fourth amendment is the one most fre-
quently relied upon.
10 8
104. See supra note 100.
105. Inter alia, the concerns are: whether the primary purpose of the suit is to recover
property or to restrain a tax collection, Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1282 (5th Cir.
1983); balancing the plaintiff's temporary loss of the property against government's inter-
est in protecting the secrecy of an investigation, Shea v. Gabriel 520 F.2d 879, 882 (1 st Cir.
1975); the plaintiffs need for the property, Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1975); effect of private judgment on public interest in administration ofjustice, Smith
v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1965); procrastination of official holding
property, United States v. Bell, 120 F. Supp. 670, 673 (D.D.C. 1953). Compare the factors
discussed in Hunsucker v. Phinney 497 F.2d 29, 34-35 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
927 (1975) with the three-tiered test proposed herein: (1) disregard of plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights; (2) whether plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm; and (3) whether another
adequate remedy is available.
106. See supra notes 9-12 for a brief summary of cases alleging constitutionally pro-
tected rights and supra note 14 for a review of constitutional provisions addressed in sev-
eral commentaries.
107. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
108. Property may be illegally held when plaintiffs initial consent is subsequently with-
drawn. Fourth amendment violations may occur when consent is withdrawn so that the
continued holding of the property is illegal. See supra Section I(B)(3). In some cases,
illegally held property will not be returned if the property was used to further criminal
activity or constituted the fruit of such an endeavor. See In re Wiltron Assoc., Ltd., 49
F.R.D. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (quoting authorities).
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It is important to recognize the distinction between a pleading
which seeks the return of property and one concerned with the suppression
of the use of that property in a criminal proceeding. When both sup-
pression and return are sought, the courts have generally required a
showing of a callous disregard of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. 10 9
When only the return of property is sought, however, it is not estab-
lished whether the complaint must allege a "clear"" 1 0 or a "callous" I '
disregard of the plaintiff's rights. A violation may be clear, but not nec-
essarily callous. The safest practice is to allege both possibilities."1
2
Adherence to this suppression-versus-return distinction avoids an
additional problem: a premature decision on the merits of a criminal
prosecution. Some courts might find it necessary to ascertain whether a
constitutional violation has occurred before ordering the return of prop-
erty. The constitutional question is more appropriately decided after an
indictment has been issued and when the return of property would be
governed by Rule 41(e). This view incorporates a concern for judicial
expediency by avoiding potentially redundant, time consuming, and
costly litigation. In addition, this approach would enhance compliance
with an individual's constitutional rights by lessening the burden im-
posed upon him by the court. Therefore, relief in anomalous jurisdic-
tion cases should more appropriately depend upon satisfaction of the
more equitable considerations of lack of an adequate alternative remedy
and a showing of irreparable injury.
B. Irreparable Injury
This aspect of the test should be considered in conjunction with the
availability of alternative adequate remedies (section II(G)) in that the
underlying purpose of anomalous jurisdiction is to relieve a plaintiff's
intolerable hardship resulting from an unlawful deprivation of
property. 1
13
The two considerations addressed in the cases are the plaintiff's
need for the property,114 and the alleged stigma caused by a wrongful
109. See Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975); Silbert v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 765, 767-68 (D.Md. 1967). Cf. United States
v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, 254 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 938 (1958) (re-
quiring a clear and definite showing that constitutional rights have been violated). But cf.
Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978) (callous
disregard standard to be applied only when suppression is sought).
110. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 866 (D.Minn. 1979); Donlon v.
United States, 331 F. Supp. 979, 980 (D.Del. 1971).
111. Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1983); Hunsucker v. Phinney,
497 F.2d 29, 34-35 n.10 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
112. See, e.g., Pieper v. United States, 605 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979) (jurisdiction
requires "clear showing of a search and seizure in callous disregard of the fourth
amendment").
113. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10 (1976) (discussion of standards for grant-
ing or denying injunctive relief).
114. See Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 18 (7th Cir.
1978) (plaintiff needed funds seized to satisfy tax liability); Mason v. Pulliam, 402 F. Supp.
978, 981 (N.D.Ga. 1975), aff'd, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977) (irreparable injury would
result if criminal indictment issues from wrongfully seized materials).
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possession which accordingly results in a wrongful indictment."15 Be-
cause the right to have property returned is not synonymous with the
right to have illegally-seized evidence suppressed, injunctions seeking
the return of property should focus on the plaintiffs need for the prop-
erty, as the stigma suffered by the plaintiff is more appropriately associ-
ated with exclusion of wrongfully retained evidence. Therefore, the
irreparable injury factor for determining the exercise of anomalous ju-
risdiction should be a balancing test to determine whether the plaintiffs
prospects for irreparable injury outweigh the state's need for the prop-
erty as part of a criminal investigation. This would reduce undue inter-
ference with the criminal justice system while preserving the individual's
right to the property.
C. Unavailability of an Alternative Remedy
Traditionally, equitable relief is barred by the availability of an ade-
quate remedy at law. Yet in the context of a criminal proceeding, the
rhetoric of equity concerning "an adequate remedy at law" is tradition-
ally inapplicable. Rather, the prospect of equitable relief in this context
should be conditioned on the availability of sufficient alternative reme-
dies. This approach would avoid the semantic difficulties of reconciling
criminal proceedings involving property with the traditional terminol-
ogy of equity.
The availability of a jurisdictional alternative remedy is no longer a
requirement to the invocation of equity jurisdiction.' 1 6 For instance,
pre-indictment relief is inappropriate to enjoin enforcement of a tax
summons, 17 and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence cannot prema-
turely bar prosecution for tax evasion because exclusion itself is an ade-
quate remedy. 18
The adequacy and availability of remedies for fourth amendment
violations must be viewed restrictively to effectuate the purposes of the
exclusionary rule," ' 9 but the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule
is not as tangible when there is no criminal prosecution pending from
which evidence may be excluded. Despite the reduced importance of
the exclusionary rule in circumstances where no criminal proceedings
exist, the courts should still require a clear showing that no alternative
remedies are available.
Accordingly, some of the anomalous jurisdiction cases undertake an
115. Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.l0 (5th Cir. 1975) (stigma not removed by
a judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34
(5th Cir. 1974), (examination of wrongfully seized materials leading to issuance of wrong-
ful indictment would inflict irreparable stigma), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). But see In
re Compola, 543 F. Supp. 115, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (stigma by itself not irreparable
injury).
116. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.5 (1976).
117. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446-50 (1964).
118. Cf. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (implicit assumption that ex-
clusion of evidence does not bar prosecution altogether).
119. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
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analysis of the various remedies that might be available, 120 premised on
the caution and restraint exercised by the courts in this area. 12 1 The
most significant remedies, which provide alternatives to the non-statu-
tory civil suit for return of property, are administrative actions in tax
cases, declaratory relief, mandamus, and other statutory bases for the
return of property held by the government.
122
Administrative remedies in tax cases include the return of property
as ancillary relief in a suit for a refund or a summons enforcement pro-
ceeding. 123 A refund suit may be an inadequate remedy where the
plaintiff seeks recompense for alleged abuses, rather than the return of
improperly assessed taxes. Such suits, however, must be read in con-
junction with the congressional prohibition against injunctions which ef-
fectively restrain assessment or collection of federal taxes.1 24 One
purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act is to minimize civil pre-enforcement
interference, while affording the individual the opportunity to deter-
mine his right to the disputed tax in a suit for a refund. 125
It is nevertheless possible to avoid the Act's prohibition against
such injunctions where equity jurisdiction exists and the government
could not possibly prevail. 126 The plaintiff must clearly establish the in-
adequacy of legal remedies.
127
Sharp division in the application of the Anti-Injunction Act surfaced
in the recent case of Linn v. Chivatero.128 A taxpayer and his attorney
sued the I.R.S. District Director, seeking injunctions prohibiting the use,
120. See Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983) (alternative, inadequate rem-
edies discussed were a suit for tax refund or suppression of the evidence in non-existent
criminal proceeding); United States v. Rapp, 539 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1976) (replevin or a
claim under the Tucker Act for deprivation of property without due process of law); In re
J.W. Schonfeld, Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Va. 1978) (suppression and return in a
suit for refund, or in a criminal proceeding the taxpayer may request return); United
States v. Bell, 120 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1954) (administrative relief, trespass against the
officer, or assertion of property rights in the district's action in libel proceeding for
forfeiture).
121. See supra note 60 and accompanying text regarding caution and restraint analysis.
122. See supra note 120. Other procedural devices include intervention. Chakejian v.
Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (intervention by taxpayer into enforcement pro-
ceedings against third party); In re Wilton Assoc., Ltd., 49 F.R.D. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(interpleader).
123. Jurisdiction over taxpayer suits for refunds of federal taxes is provided in 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982). Jurisdiction over I.R.S. summons enforcement suits, triggered
by taxpayer noncompliance, is provided in 26 U.S.C. § 7402(b) (1982).
124. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a) (1982).
125. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974).
126. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (the plaintiff
must show that "under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States
cannot establish its claim . . ."). The Supreme Court previously held that special and
extraordinary circumstances could make the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable. Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932). Enocks limited the Miler potential
for merely applying equity practice as it existed prior to passage of the Act, thus forming
the basis for the more strict interpretation of the Act in Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725 (1974).
127. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
128. 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983).
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and ordering the return, of documents accidentally produced in re-
sponse to an I.R.S. summons. 129 The key issue was the applicability of
the Anti-Injunction Act in suits where anomalous jurisdiction is
presented. The trial court, although dismissing for lack of jurisdic-
tion,1 30 presumed the existence of both federal question jurisdiction
and anomalous jurisdiction. '3 ' The appellate majority "refuse[d] to ad-
dress the continued validity of anomalous jurisdiction . . .despite a
confused body of caselaw in need of clarification."'13 2 The court held
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not barjurisdiction. It characterized the
taxpayer's requested injunctive relief as a controversy arising under the
fourth amendment search and seizure provision.13 3 The elimination of
the amount in controversy requirement in federal question cases
avoided the problem of transforming the injunctive suit for the return of
property into a controversy concerning federal taxes which would be in
violation of the Anti-Injunction Act.' 3 4 The concurring opinion ob-
served that the distinction made by the majority between a search and
seizure issue and a tax issue, to determine whether jurisdiction existed,
was inconsistent with the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.1
3 5
Linn, therefore, establishes a significant hurdle by inhibiting the ex-
ercise of anomalous jurisdiction in tax cases governed by the Anti-In-
junction Act. The case must certainly be characterized as one involving
the return of property rather than one possibly involving a search and
seizure issue.
The Declaratory Relief Act could conceivably present an alternative
remedy, but an order for the return of property is simply not a declara-
toryjudgment. In addition, although the plaintiff might perceive a suffi-
cient controversy, the courts have not viewed the circumstance
triggering anomalous jurisdiction as a controversy within the meaning of
the Act. '
3 6
One proposed remedy is mandamus. 137 Since proceedings under
the mandamus statute are prohibitively intricate,13 8 the remedy has
been characterized as both potentially available' 3 9 and clearly unavaila-
129. Id. at 1279.
130. The trial court's dismissal was reversed and remanded for a determination of the
propriety of the government's retention of the accidentally produced documents. Id. at
1285.
131. Id. at 1281.
132. Id. at 1285 (Clark, CJ., concurring).
133. Id. at 1281.
134. Id. at 1282-84. See also Hunsucker v. Phinney 497 F.2d 29, 36 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
135. Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1286 (Clark, CJ., concurring).
136. In re Shoenfeld, Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 332, 338-39 (E.D.Va. 1978) (injunctive relief
seeking return of taxpayer's property not within Declaratory Relief Act).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982); French, The Frontiers of the Federal Mandamus Statute, 21
Vsu.. L. REv. 637 (1976).
138. Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir. 1978).
139. Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 36 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975); Mason v. Pulliam, 402 F. Supp. 978, 980 (N.D.Ga. 1975), af'd, 557 F.2d 426 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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ble.140 Since the purpose of mandamus is to review ministerial (as op-
posed to discretionary) acts, 14 1 the remedy is clearly unavailable.
Another alternative to non-statutory anomalous jurisdiction is a
statutory suit for the return of property under section 1356 of the Judi-
cial Code. 14 2 Yet in Hunsucker v. Phinney,143 the court declined to con-
strue section 1356 in such a manner as to enable it to order the return of
the taxpayer's property. 144 Other courts have failed to find section 1356
jurisdiction, 14 5 and the American Law Institute has proposed its re-
peal.' 46 Finally, state courts are an inappropriate forum under the stat-
ute, 14 7 precluding its application in any manner by a state court.
It would appear from the foregoing that alternative remedies rarely
exist, suggesting that in most situations equity lies in favor of the truly
aggrieved plaintiff. Yet, to expand federal jurisdiction without authority
is a questionable path for the courts to follow. But how else can the
wronged individual secure his rights to property? The following conclu-
sion addresses this problem.
CONCLUSION
Federal subject matter jurisdiction in suits against federal officers
cannot exist in the absence of a statutory waiver of immunity.148 Addi-
tionally, there is no general statutory jurisdiction for suits against fed-
eral agencies and officers.' 49 At one time the courts were sharply
divided over the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act provi-
sion that a "person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."'150 But in 1977, in
Califano v. Sanders, 151 the Supreme Court resolved the controversy, hold-
ing that the Administrative Procedure Act did not independently confer
140. Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (mandamus unavailable absent specific statute defining officer's duties).
141. See, e.g., Kirkland Masonry, Inc. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 532, 533-34 (5th Cir.
1980); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1073 (1979); Associated Businesses of Franklin, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
522 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D.Ohio 1981).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1356 (1982). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), provides for
suits against the sovereign for any seizure under any law of the United States on land or
upon waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Yet anomalous jurisdiction
plaintiffs seek injunctive rather than monetary relief. Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29,
36 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
143. 497 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. dernied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
144. 497 F.2d at 35.
145. See Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817) (analyzing predecessor of
§ 1356);Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1957).
146. A.L.I., Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts § 1311
(1969).
147. Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 9-11 (1817).
148. See supra notes 88 and 89.
149. See supra note 91.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (emphasis added). The division of authority is covered in
14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 3655 n.10
(1985).
151. 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977).
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jurisdiction on a court. Once again, the individual seeking the exercise
of anomalous jurisdiction was left without an alternative.
This author advances two proposals. The lower federal courts
should rely exclusively upon the general federal question statute, in spite
of underlying jurisdictional problems. 152 This may ultimately force the
issue of whether the federal common law of anomalous jurisdiction in-
volves a "law" within the meaning of section 1331 of the Judicial
Code.
153
The preferred proposal is for Congress to include an injunctive re-
lief alternative in the proposed amendments to the Federal Tort Claims
Act.15 This would provide an express equitable remedy which would
facilitate the policies underlying the current damage statute.
Nevertheless, the latter proposal has at least two drawbacks. First,
it would encourage civil claims for the return of property prior to the
completion of criminal investigations. Second, its effect would approach
the creation of undesirable statutory jurisdiction over suits against fed-
eral agencies and officers, because claims against the latter must allege
either specific statutory authorization, or that the suit is against the fed-
eral government.'
55
An amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act would have to be
interpreted or drafted in such a way as to strike a balance between the
government's interest in expediency in the criminal justice system and
the individual's interest in his rights to property. Providing statutory
relief would eliminate both the current uncertainty accompanying a non-
statutory extension of federal jurisdiction, as well as the drain imposed
upon judicial resources in attempting to ascertain a basis for this power.
There still exists the less optimistic possibility that congressional inac-
tion and judicial confusion will prohibit the now uncertain remedy con-
tained in the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction.
152. See supra section I(B)(5).
153. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text for current problems with the
F.T.C.A.
155. See Boelens v. Redman Howes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing
cases from various circuits); see also McQpary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971).
